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Abstract—Existing incentive schemes for peer-to-peer (P2P)
file-sharing are rate-based, giving room for strategic peers to
benefit from manipulative behaviors so as to treat honest peers
unfairly. Specifically, strategic peers can achieve high perfor-
mance by providing high upload rates which are useless to the
system. On the other hand, honest peers suffer from getting low
download rates even if they devote chunks with very high values
which do great help to the system and other peers.
In this paper, we first show that whether to upload high
value chunks or low value ones in BitTorrent is a prisoners’
dilemma game. We then propose a novel value-based metric,
through which peers are rewarded for uploading high value
chunks. We prove that by adopting the value-based metric,
chunk exchange becomes a repeated game. Our simulation results
indicate that our value-based approach can effectively motivate
peers to contribute high value chunks to the system, which, in
turn, also benefits from value-based metric by achieving a higher
propagation speed of the very first copy of the file.
Index Terms—P2P file-sharing, value-based exchange, BitTor-
rent, game theory, incentive, chunk value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems reap staggering success during
the past two decades, especially in the applications for sharing
large files. However, the success of a P2P system hinges
critically on the cooperation among peers. Obviously such co-
operation has to be induced by using some incentive schemes.
Indeed, a myriad of incentive schemes have been designed [1].
In particular, BitTorrent [2] is arguably the most successful
system in P2P file-sharing.
Nonetheless, there are still “cracks” in the design of the
BitTorrent strategy, manifested as: (1) loop-holes in policies,
and (2) inadequate contribution measurement metrics. Indeed,
much recent work has been done in investigating the deficiency
of BitTorrent’s policies. For instance, BitTyrant [3] and Bit-
Thief [4] take advantage of BitTorrent’s unchoke policy and
optimistic unchoke policy to gain benefit. Levin et al. [5] have
tackled this problem, by designing a proportional share policy
against these strategic behaviors.
We contest that the problem of using inadequate contri-
bution measurement metrics could be an even more acute
issue, which is unfortunately largely overlooked in practical
systems. As in BitTorrent, most of the existing protocols for
P2P systems use rate-based metrics to measure contributions.
Specifically, a higher upload rate means a higher contribution
level. Consequently, chunk value is neglected in these proto-
cols. Indeed, these existing protocols are designed based on
the premises that peers do not care about chunk values, which
is unreasonable from an economics point of view. In P2P file-
sharing systems, files are divided into chunks of same size, for
the sake of easier distribution. Such regularity in chunk size
could easily lead to the illusive idea that chunks are equally
good. However, rare chunks are obviously more valuable to
the system. Accordingly BitTorrent’s high efficiency is largely
based on its rarest-first policy. Unfortunately, success of the
rarest-first policy relies largely on the honesty of peers in
reporting their chunk maps. Indeed, Levin et al. [5] have shown
that rational peers tend to conceal some high rarity chunks to
prolong their “attractiveness” at their neighbors. Such selfish
actions could significantly degrade the propagation speed of
useful chunks in the system, as shown by Legout et al. [6]. This
will in turn lead to a lower system performance. In view of this
problem, recently a rate-based approach, called prTorrent [7],
is designed to motivate peers to contribute high rarity chunks.
We believe that as in most real-life scenarios, quality of
contribution is much more important than quantity. Thus, our
thesis is that an effective exchange can only be realized with
a value-based metric. Accordingly, in our study we propose
a novel value-based metric, which is defined by taking into
consideration of chunk rarity. Based on this new metric, we
then formulate the chunk contribution process as a game.
Specifically, we first show that the BitTorrent protocol is a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which can then be transformed
into a repeated game under our value-based framework. Peers’
contribution levels are quantified by the aggregated values
in previous uploading rounds, determining their unchoking
opportunities in the next round. Finally, we compare the incen-
tive effectiveness between rate-based and value-based metrics.
Our simulation results indicate that equipped with the value-
based contribution measurement, BitTorrent’s performance is
improved significantly.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the game theoretic formulation of the BitTorrent protocol.
In Section III we propose our novel value-based metric.
Section IV shows that value-based metric transforms chunk
contribution process into a repeated game. Section V contains
our simulation results and their interpretations. Finally, Sec-
tion VI gives the concluding remarks.
II. PRISONERS’ DILEMMA IN BITTORRENT
In this section, we use a game theoretical model to illustrate
why peers tend to upload more low value chunks instead of
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2TABLE I: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in BitTorrent.
Bob Uploads High Bob Uploads Low
Alice
Uploads High (ua(H;H),ub(H;H)) (ua(H;L),ub(H;L))
Alice
Uploads Low (ua(L;H),ub(L;H)) (ua(L;L),ub(L;L))
high value chunks in BitTorrent.
Suppose there are two peers, Alice and Bob, connected to
each other in BitTorrent. Both of them unchoke each other
during a time period. Each peer has a choice of revealing
high value chunks or low value chunks to the other, and thus,
each peer’s set of action is fHigh; Lowg. The payoff function
u for Alice and Bob are the same. The game is illustrated in
Table I.
In P2P file-sharing, possessing more high value chunks
means larger chance to gain more neighbors, usually leading
to a higher download rate. Thus, the benefit of downloading
a high value chunk is larger than that of downloading a low
value one. Meanwhile, because uploading a high value chunk
to the neighbor has a higher chance to lose more interest
among the neighbors than uploading a low value chunk, the
cost of uploading a high value chunk is larger than uploading
a low value one. Consequently, Alice and Bob are both very
glad to upload low value chunks more and downloading high
value chunks more. Because a rate-based metric is used in
BitTorrent for measuring contribution, the other peer will treat
it the same whether it uploads high value chunks or low
value ones, provided the rate is the same. As a result, we can
easily prove that in BitTorrent, for two collaborating peers,
whether to uploading high value chunks or low value ones,
is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game [8]. This is formalized by the
following theorem.
THEOREM 1. In BitTorrent, whether to upload high value
chunks or low value ones to their counterparts is a Prisoners’
Dilemma game.
Proof. Because uploading a high value chunk costs more than
uploading a low value one, and downloading a high value
chunk brings more benefit than downloading a low value one.
Thus, we have u(H;X) < u(L;X), and u(X;H) > u(X;L),
X can be H or L.
When both of them uploading high value chunks to the
other, because the loss in attractiveness can be neutralize by
the new chunk it just got, and meanwhile it obtains a high
value chunk. Thus, the payoff of the two peers when both
upload high value chunks is larger than that when both uploads
low value chunks, i.e., u(H;H) > u(L;L).
Thus, we can conclude that: For Alice,
ua(L;H) > ua(H;H) > ua(L;L) > ua(H;L) (1)
For Bob,
ub(H;L) > ub(H;H) > ub(L;L) > ub(L;H) (2)
Thus, this game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Because it is a Prisoners’ Dilemma in BitTorrent, there is
only one Nash equilibrium of this game: Both of them upload
low value chunks to the other. Uploading high value chunks
will not bring more benefit than uploading low value ones, and
instead, keeping them might make the peer prolong its interest
in the future. If all the rational peers are aware of this, all
of them must choose to upload low value chunks rather than
high value ones when it has choice. If this happens, high value
chunks are kept and low value chunks are excessively spread.
The system performance will then be severely damaged.
III. A NOVEL VALUE-BASED APPROACH
Rate-based metric in BitTorrent can lead to conflict-of-
interest between individual peer’s profit and the system’s
profit, which makes peers tend to strategically conceal high
value chunks. Because chunk rarity is a crucial factor, making
chunks have different importance to the system and individual
peers, we propose a value-based metric in which chunk rarity
is taken into consideration in the chunk valuation function.
A. Valuation Function
We have defined an equation to calculate one chunk’s value,
taking into consideration of chunk rarity. Equation (3) is chunk
j’s valuation function for peer i.
vij(t) =
(
log ( 1
cij(t)
+ 1); 1  cij(t) < N(t)
0; cij(t) = N(t)
(3)
In our system model, chunk value is a time-dependent vari-
able. A peer calculates one chunk’s value according to local
information, which means it uses the chunk map information
its neighbors revealed to it.
Specifically, vij(t) is the value of chunk j at time t for
peer i. cij(t) is the number of copies of chunk j in peer i’s
neighbors at time t. N(t) is the number of peers involving
in the system at time t. vij(t) is a positive value when there
are still peers who do not have this chunk at this time, i.e.,
cij(t) < N(t). In a typical file-sharing scenario, there should
be at least one copy of a chunk at any time; otherwise, the
system will be unable to complete the distribution of this file.
Thus, cij(t)  1 at any time point. The larger the number of
copies of a chunk, the lower its value is. The valuation function
is convex, representing the diminishing marginal reduction as
the number of chunk copies increases.
Throughout this paper, we use this valuation function to
evaluate peers’ contribution to the system, and propose a
value-based BitTorrent protocol in the following section. This
paper is a preliminary study of the effect of chunk valuation,
and only rarity is considered in the value function. In our
another ongoing work, the situation that a chunk has different
values to different peers is studied.
B. Value-based BitTorrent Strategy (VBT)
Using valuation function defined in Equation (3), we make
a small modification to BitTorrent protocol [1]. Specifically
in the new protocol modified from BitTorrent, when a peer
unchokes its neighbors, instead of taking into consideration of
the uploading rate (rate-based) in the previous rounds, it makes
decision according to the aggregate uploading chunks’ value
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3TABLE II: Repeated Game in VBT.
Uploading high Uploading low
value chunks value chunks
Payoff this round ph pl
Payoff next round   x   x
(value-based) of the neighbors. In this value-based BitTorrent
(VBT) protocol, peers are rewarded for uploading high value
chunks, by taking into consideration of aggregated chunk value
when unchoking peers. The contribution function of peer i to
peer j in round t Cij(t) is:
Cij(t) = kfk(t)  vk(t) (4)
Note that fk(t) is the fraction of chunk k peer j got from peer
i in round t.
In VBT, peers might still be able to prolong their interest
among its neighbors by concealing high value chunks, how-
ever, at the risk of losing the unchoking opportunities in the
next round.
IV. REPEATED GAME IN VALUE-BASED BITTORRENT
In VBT, because value-based metric is adopted, a peer’s
behavior, uploading high value chunks or low value ones, will
affect its unchoking result in its neighbors in the next round.
Thus, in VBT, it’s a repeated game [8]. Peer a’s payoff is
illustrated in Table II
Here,  and  are the possibilities that a peer’s neighbor
will continue cooperating with it for the situations, where the
peer uploads high value chunks or low value ones, respectively.
Because value-based metric is adopted, every peer values high
value chunks more than low value ones when unchoking its
neighbors. Thus,  must be larger than . x is the benefit in
the next round if peer a can be unchoked. If the peer loses the
opportunity of being unchoked in the next round, its benefit
in the next round is zero. Thus, the payoffs in the next round
when the peer uploads high value chunks and low value ones
are   x and   x, respectively.
Notice that ph and pl is the benefits of the peer if it uploads
high value chunks or low value ones in this round. From the
protocol, we know that the behavior this round has no effect
on the benefit of this round. Its effect is in the next round.
Thus, the payoff a peer behaves strategically this round must
be larger than it behaves honest, pl > ph. This is because the
long-term interest of preserving chunks. Preserving high value
chunks has higher possibility to prolong its interest among its
neighbors than preserving low value ones.
If peer a behaves honestly in this round, its aggregate payoff
is:
ph + x (5)
If peer a behaves strategically in this round, its aggregate
payoff is:
pl + x (6)
When we have:
pl + x  ph + x (7)
the peer tends to behave strategically; otherwise, it tends to
behave honestly.
From Equation (7), we can get:
(pl   ph)  (  )x (8)
Thus, whether to behave honestly or strategically, for a
rational peer, depends on the profit of prolonging its interest
by concealing high value chunks this round, (pl ph), and the
risk of losing unchoked opportunity in the next round due to
concealing, (   ), and the profit of being unchoked in the
next round, x.
For an individual peer, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to predict the result of Equation (8). However, we can still
deduce some useful insights. If the upload capacities of the
competitors are similar, which means whether to upload high
value chunks or low value ones plays an important role in
getting the chance of being unchoked in the next round ( 
is large), a peer tends to behave honestly. In addition, in a
system which has various capacities peers, the poor ones tend
to behave honestly because their    are large.
On the contrary, suppose there is a very rich peer, in terms
of upload capacity, most of whose competitors are poor peers.
The difference between its  and  should be very small
because VBT is still based on the unchoking algorithm of
the original BitTorrent, i.e., unchoking the top four peers and
allocating them the same bandwidth. This peers is rich enough
that contributing high value chunks or low value ones make
no difference about its rank among its neighbors. What should
be clarified is that, this only happens when most of the rich
peers’ competitors are far poorer than it.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate the following problems:
Firstly, can value-based metric effectively suppress strategic
behavior, which means gaming the system by only contributing
low value chunks? Secondly, whether or not the system can
benefit from value-based metric? Thirdly, when value-based
metric is carried out, is the goal of “devote more, gain more”
really achieved?
There will be two kinds of peers in our experiments:
honest peers and strategic rational peers. The only difference
between the modeling of honest peers and strategic peers in
our experiments is the chunk map revealing strategy. An honest
peer simply publishes its true chunk map to its neighbors.
A strategic peer only updates new chunk when its neighbor
loses interest towards it [5]. From the existing chunk map, the
strategic peer selects the chunk with the smallest value among
all the chunks this neighbor does not have to publish. Using
this strategy, the aggregated chunk value it uploaded to others
is as small as possible, and benefit from prolonging its interest
among the neighbors. 20% peers are set to be strategic peers.
A. Simulation Environment
We conducted the experiments using the well-known BitTor-
rent simulator provided by [9], which is also used by many
BitTorrent studies. There are one thousand peers joining in the
system, following a poisson join pattern, with the average join
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4TABLE III: Bandwidth Distribution.
Fraction Upload Bandwidth Download Bandwidth
(Kbps) (Kbps)
0.2 128 784
0.4 384 1500
0.25 1000 3000
0.15 5000 10000
rate of 2 per second. There is one source seed whose upload
capacity is 1000 Kbps, staying in the system throughout the
simulation. The file shared is 100 MB and equally divided into
400 chunks. We use the bandwidth distribution in Table III
which is derived from the actual distribution of Gnutella
nodes [9], [10].
Peers leave the system as soon as they finish downloading
the whole file, or, they quit because of starvation. If a peer
can not download anything at all for a certain time period,
which we call tolerance range, it will leave the system. This
departure pattern is used to mimic the real behaviors when
people try to download something from the internet. We run
the simulation, until all the peers leave the system.
B. Resilience Against Strategic Behaviors
Figure 1 shows the comparison of average download rate
of honest peers and strategic peers, between BitTorrent and
VBT. Figure 2 shows the comparison of successful rate of
honest peers and strategic peers. Here, Successful rate means
the fraction of peers who finally successfully get the whole file
in the population. The tolerance range is set to be 10 seconds.
In BitTorrent, strategic peers have higher average download
rate and successful rate than honest ones. This implies that if
one peer joins in the group of peers who behave strategically,
the expected download rate and the possibility of successfully
get the whole file are higher than behaving honestly. From
this point of view, BitTorrent actually motivates peers to
behave strategically. On the contrary, VBT effectively punishes
strategic peers. Both the average download rate and successful
rate of strategic peers is much lower than honest peers.
Although strategic peers might cause certain degree of
chunk value distortion, the experiments in our paper shows
that when the fraction of strategic peers is 20%, chunk map
concealing behavior is efficiently suppressed. Due to the limit
of space, we omit simulation results when the fraction of
strategic peers varies.
Due to the adoption of value-based metrics, peers are
unchoked according to aggregated value instead of rate. Some
high capacity peers might be choked because of their low
contribution in terms of low upload value, even if their upload
rate is relatively high. Thus, the performance of honest peers
falls a little in VBT. However, it is worth it for a much more
robust and sustainable system.
1) Impact of Tolerance Range: In our study, the modeling
of peer departure is to mimic real behaviors of people,
however, it is very difficult to get an empirical result which
indicates how long the tolerance range of the peers could be.
Longer tolerance range means more patience to others, which
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Fig. 1: Average download rate comparison.
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might imply a higher tolerance degree towards strategic be-
haviors. To make sure the effectiveness of VBT in suppressing
strategically behavior, we further study that when the tolerance
range of the peers in the system varies, whether VBT is still
effective in punishing strategic peers. Figure 3 confirms the
effectiveness of VBT, by showing that when the tolerance
range varies from 20 seconds to 1 minute, the strategic peers
are always punished by suffering from lower download rate
than honest peers.
2) Performance of Rich Peers: The intuitive deduction
in Section IV implies that even after value-based metric is
enforced, rich peers still tend to behave strategically. To further
investigate this issue, we compare the performance of strategic
rich peers and honest rich peers when the fraction of rich
peers varies in the population. Only two categories of peers,
high capacity (5000 Kbps, 10000 Kbps) and low capacity (384
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Fig. 3: Average download rate comparison.
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Fig. 4: Average download rate comparison.
Kbps, 1500 Kbps), are included in the system. We vary the
fraction of high capacity peers in the system, a half of high
capacity peers behave strategically, and the other half behave
honestly.
Figure 4 shows that when the fraction of high capacity
peers is small, below 10%, the strategic peers have higher
average download rate than honest peers. However, when
the fraction becomes larger, the strategic peers suffer from
lower average download rate than honest peers. A plausible
explanation might be that when the fraction of high capacity
peers increases, the fraction of high capacity peers in rich
peer’s competitors also increased. Thus, it can no longer keep
the unchoke opportunity at its neighbors simply by high upload
rate.
Although when the fraction of rich peers is very small,
they might tend to behave strategically, we believe that VBT
is still very effective because 10% is a very small fraction.
According to the bandwidth distribution derived from the
actual distribution of Gnutella nodes [9], [10], the fraction
of (5000 Kbps, 10000 Kbps) is 15%.
C. The Propagation Speed of the Very FIRST Copy of the File
In a P2P file-sharing system, the propagation speed of the
very first copy of the file is very important, because the seeds
can leave the system at any moment. When people download
some file using BitTorrent, it often happens that when the file is
nearly finished, the downloading process abruptly stops, which
cannot be resumed any more. A very probable cause is that all
the seeds have left the system, and among all the leechers in
the system, there is not a whole copy of this file. Some chunks
can never be downloaded because of the lack of a complete
copy of the file. Thus, in a realistic system, the propagation
speed of the very first copy of the file is crucial for system
robustness. Indeed, the faster the propagation of the very first
copy of the file, the more robust the system is.
In this section, we compare the propagation speed of the
very first copy of the file in BitTorrent and VBT. There is
only one seed in the system, and the upload capacity of the
seed is varied from 1000 Kbps to 3000 Kbps. All the peers
here are honest peers. Figure 5 shows that VBT always has
shorter propagation time of the very first copy of the file than
BitTorrent.
VBT uses a value-based metric to measure peers’ contri-
bution. Thus, peers who have more high value chunks are
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Fig. 5: The propagation time comparison.
emphasized, and thus can get more good neighbors, which
have high upload capacity and large amount of chunks. High
value chunks therefore get better propagation chances, and
thus, there are more transactions about high value chunks in
VBT than in BitTorrent. Thus, the propagation of the very first
copy is faster in VBT.
D. Devote more, gain more?
It is interesting to study the scenario where all the peers
have the same upload and download capacity, 384 Kbps and
1500 Kbps. We use the homogeneous scenario to ensure a
simpler evaluation and clearer elaboration.
1) Contribution Rate and Download Rate: In a P2P file-
sharing system, one intuitive view is that if you devote more,
you can get higher download rate. Figures 6 and 7 are the
correlation map between contribution rate and download rate
for BitTorrent and VBT. From the perspective of the system, it
will be more helpful to get high value chunks spreading faster.
Thus, we measure peers’ contribution by the aggregated chunk
value it devoted.
In BitTorrent, higher contribution rate does not necessarily
lead to higher download rate, both for honest and strategic
peers. While in VBT, the correlation is linear for honest peers.
Thus, in VBT, honest peers are encouraged to raise their
contribution rates if they want to get higher download rate.
However, strategic peers are treated totally differently. Even if
strategic peers devote very high contribution rate, its download
rate does not increase. One reason might be that strategic peers
always just give the lowest value chunks to its neighbors, even
if it saturates all its upload capacity, it still lose the unchoking
opportunities from its neighbors.
2) Contribution Rate and Long-Term Profit: If one peer
keeps its upload rate as high as possible, will it actually benefit
from this behavior in the long term? In other words, can it
finally be successful in downloading the whole file? Because
peers who honestly publish their chunk maps might quickly
become unattractive from their neighbors’ point of view, and
be forced to quit from the system due to starvation, when
they have no chunks its neighbors are interested in. Figures 8
and 9 are the correlation map between contribution rate and
the final result, which is the chunk volume (i.e., number of
chunks) it successfully downloaded when it leaves the system.
We want to see whether or not higher uploading rate will
necessarily lead to good final result, which means, getting a
Globecom 2013 - Symposium on Selected Areas in Communications3106
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Fig. 6: Contribution rate and download rate in BitTorrent.
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Fig. 7: Contribution rate and download rate in VBT.
larger fraction of the file instead of quitting at early stage
because of starvation.
In BitTorrent, honest peers and strategic peers encounter
similar situation. Peers contribute higher rate cannot necessar-
ily get to late stage, and some peers contribute very high rate
are starved at very early stage. In VBT, there is a positive
correlation between contribution rate and final result (the quit
stage) for honest peers, however, not linear. Only the peers
upload with high contribution rate can get to the late stage,
which means getting more chunks. However, for strategic
peers, even they raise their contribution rate to very high
standard, they are starved at very early stage.
In addition, the results of VBT also imply that after achiev-
ing some level, the contribution rate is not the bottleneck.
There must be other bottlenecks which impact the final result.
One possibility is the chunk map. Many peers might not have
enough chunks to attract enough good neighbors.
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Fig. 8: Contribution rate and final result in BitTorrent.
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Fig. 9: Contribution rate and final result in VBT.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented the following contributions in this paper.
Firstly, we model the strategic behavior of rational peers in
BitTorrent, and show that it is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Empirical studies further verified this conclusion. Secondly, a
value-based metric is proposed for P2P file-sharing system.
The game theoretic model illustrates that in VBT, whether
to upload high value chunks or low value ones is a repeated
game. We verified by simulation experiments that VBT can
effectively suppress strategic behaviors in most situations.
Thirdly, we also studied whether the goal of “devote more,
gain more” is realized in VBT. We found that after value-based
metric is applied, in homogeneous scenario, if peers devote
higher contribute rate, it will necessarily get higher download
rate, and much higher possibility to get a larger fraction of the
file in the long run. Meanwhile, strategic peers are punished by
restricting their download rate in a limit. Finally, we find that
value-based metric is also better for the system performance
than rate-based metric. Value-based metric ensures a faster
propagation speed of the very first copy of the file, which
makes the system more robust.
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